Amateur Security Archaeologists, trying not to break things.
If you’ve known me for a while, you know I love talking about MITRE’s ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge). I probably have an unhealthy addiction to discussing it, but I do think it is helpful to understand why it is both cool and has limits. So let’s discuss!
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Good morning folks! I have some updates on the threat side of things that I think are interesting and might help in conversations with your friends and colleagues:
To be clear, I don’t want you to raze the Amazon Rainforest here. What I am referring to for this blog post is another visualization technique. Where as DFDs focused on understanding the flow of information through your systems, Attack Trees are another graphical representation to uncover how an attacker might exploit weaknesses in a system to achieve specific malicious objectives.
As you can see in the previous post, the “know yourself” side of the Threat Modeling process is extensive and covers all but one of the steps. While some may be tempted to deal only in knowing the adversary, you must grasp on your organization’s own policies, capabilities, and design to model most effectively. These efforts also feed related activities, such as project planning and roadmap development, business strategy, risk management, and procurement & staffing. Several externally focused frameworks and methodologies map adversary behaviors and their impacts to the environment and should be selected to compliment the skills and capabilities of your organization. Each offers different areas of focus, fidelity, and processes that can be adapted to your organization’s needs.
Continue readingAll of us encounter the use (and misuse) of terms like threat hunting, threat modeling, threat intelligence, and threat picture.
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